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_____________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
Technological innovation has led to the prevalent use of algorithms in everyday decision
making. So ubiquitous is the application of algorithms that many may not recognize its impact
on their daily lives. From online shopping to applying for a home loan, algorithms are at play in
categorizing and filtering individuals to serve the goal of providing more accurate and efficient
results than human decisionmaking would. At the basic level, algorithms are nothing more than
a series of step-by-step instructions compiled by a computer, which then analyzes swaths of
data based on those instructions.1 However, when algorithms use incorrect variables to filter
results - such as certain stereotypes about minorities - or, more imperceptibly, learn bad habits
from how humans behave online, our absolute reliance on their results can cause disparate harm
to minority communities.2
The pervasive use of algorithms by both corporate and government organizations for the
purposes of efficiency and pattern analysis in the collection of Big Data has brought questions
to light as to (1) whether these algorithms are fair across the board and (2) whether they
contribute to disparate outcomes resulting in discriminatory practices. The inquiry then
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ultimately turns to the legal methods to regulate algorithms in order to combat their negative
influence while still maintaining all the technological success and convenience society enjoys.
Defining Algorithms
I.

What Are Algorithms?
“Algorithm” is a generic term that, at the most basic level, simply means “a sequence of

instructions telling a computer what to do.”3 It is created from a string of computer codes that
analyzes, filters, and select information from large data sets about individuals and trends.
Algorithms can also track behavior over time and reverse engineer data to determine the
individual characteristics that make up a particular result. For example, banks use algorithms to
detect money laundering by tracking every transaction the bank makes on a daily basis to find
suspicious activity at the root of the money laundering.4 An algorithm is also the formula that
search engines like Google use to show tailored results for our searches or suggestions of
products that Amazon predicts and individual will purchase based on previous search history
product purchases. Algorithms are also responsible for recommending the television programs
one watches, books they read, and people they date. While these seem like benefits to
maximize our preferences, algorithms can also be used to determine whether an individual is
likely to be a hardworking employee, commit a crime, or be a bad driver.5
The advantage of algorithms is that they are useful to navigate large amounts of data
(analyzing about 2.5 quintillion bytes of data that are generated each day)6 that humans are
incapable of synthesizing, and subsequently draw conclusions and identify patterns from all the
data. They are also cost and time-efficient while drawing objective, logical conclusions of the
3
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chaotic social order humans have created. However, society has begun to recognize the dangers
brought by the tailored efficiency of algorithms. By sifting through an individual’s preferences
and providing the best search results to suit the preference, a filter bubble emerges in which
individuals are unable to see opposing or alternative viewpoints or products in social media or
online shopping activities. For example, Google searches will provide very different results to
individuals who the algorithm deems to be a liberal from online activity than to individuals who
are deemed to be conservatives. Results may also differ between those the algorithm deems to
be male and those deemed female, again by tracking the individual's’ online behavior over
time.7 And while some may say this is, again, benign and positive preference individualization,
consider the dangers when such differences are used by the government to determine criminal
threats. Police departments across the country have used algorithms to detect whether a
particular neighborhood in the city is more likely to attract crime based on past police activity,
as well as what types of individuals are more likely to reoffend based on one’s age, childhood
factors, and resident zip code.8
The danger of such reliance on algorithms is that, despite the benefits and assumption
that algorithms are efficient, logical, and data-driven and therefore unbiased, algorithms are not
infallible and oftentimes carry biases of their own or of their creators.9 Algorithms are not only
sometimes wrong in predicting shopping preferences, but even more dangerous, are noted to
turn out false positives and false negatives in forecasting individuals likely to commit a crime.10
Such mistakes based on incorrect assumptions or stereotypes about an individual’s
characteristics (age, race, gender, zip code, etc.) results in unfortunate consequences for those of
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differing socioeconomic and racial backgrounds when used in policymaking, police strategies,
or employment hiring practices.
II.

How Do Algorithms Work?
Big data is the term given to the large amounts of data gathered by companies about

individuals through the use of devices, computers, and the internet.11 Big data is necessary for
algorithms to function and crunch numbers. In order for algorithms to work initially, there needs
to be a starting set of data to be analyzed.12 The more data the better for learning algorithms
because it allows the algorithms to find patterns or answer questions posed to it by combing
through enormous amounts of data.13 Learning algorithms are generally various types of subalgorithms that take in differing types of data and produce different answers based on what
information was fed into the algorithm.14 Every sub-algorithm that produces a desired result,
such as an individual clicking on a certain ad or website, increases the amount of times the subalgorithm is used to make that decision. Algorithms and data sets, at their core, are just
numbers.
Furthermore, the data that is entered into the algorithm has the ability to affect the
outcome based on the parameters set by the algorithm creator. At its very core an algorithm is a
model, a tool, to simplify and make combing through data more efficient. Unfortunately in the
process of creation the model (algorithm) is oversimplified and the creators “make choices
about what’s important enough to include, simplifying the world into a toy version that can be
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easily understood and from which we can infer important facts and actions.”15 From this desire
to over simplify, often factors that should or should not be included in the data collection
process are added to the mix resulting in discriminatory outcomes for individuals in different
sectors.
Identification of Problems with Algorithm Use
Although an algorithm may not be discriminatory in nature, the use of the algorithm’s
results can lead to disparate effects. The collection of more data about individuals as they use
the internet leads to possible new methods of discrimination. Companies and data brokers that
collect data about individuals as they surf the web and use products from different vendors
collect and aggregate all the data about individuals in order to create a profile. The problems
associated with such aggregation of data is beyond the scope of this paper, but the use of the
profile is important to consider when looking at how discrimination happens at the hands of
algorithms.
Two common discriminatory issues arise with the reliance on seemingly benign
algorithms. First, the input of data that allows algorithms to identify these trends is biased to
begin with, and then ultimately wielded by humans, results in discriminatory ends. Second, and
the more difficult problem to identify, is learner algorithms who learn from bad habits of
humans. Both theses types of algorithm use reinforce pre-existing discrimination or biases that
humans suffer from even without the use of technology.
I.

Discriminatory Input
The use of algorithms has become commonplace as technology advances because it

removes much of the pressure of decision-making off human beings. This is not only

Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy, 20
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convenient, but it is intended to remove bias inherent in human decision-making. “The
attraction of [an algorithm] isn’t hard to understand. It promoted ‘automation bias,’ an
assumption that a machine-driven, software-enabled system is going to offer better results than
human

judgment.”16 Unfortunately, the data entered into the neutral algorithm is flawed from

the beginning. Typically, the initial data entered into the system is based off previous year's
record keeping and data or factors that a particular algorithm creator deems important to
consider (race, gender, age, weight, etc.). Depending on the sector that data has inherent biases
of countless reviewers which is all fed into the algorithm. “[T]he reality is that humans craft
those algorithms and can embed in them all sorts of biases and perspectives.”17 Therefore, the
danger with this type of algorithm is that even with the most “neutral” analysis of data trends
aggregated over time, humans are still capable of using the results to draw discriminatory
conclusions and create disparate results.
II.

Machine Learning Algorithms
Machine-learning algorithms adapt to new information it acquires and fine-tunes its

targeting and analysis based on evolving input. For example, in advertisement targeting, the
learning mechanism of algorithms have identified a click-through trend from some women on
certain websites or social media sites clicking on advertisements for lower wage employment
opportunities and therefore maximized on this "success" rate by increasing the amount of such
advertisements seen by women on social media pages, user profile pages, and websites geared
toward women.18 Unfortunately, this ultimately creates a self-perpetuating bias as women are
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potentially less exposed to other employment options with higher wages on social media
platforms.
In learning how to perfect results, algorithms can perpetuate their own bias and create
the bias. Machine learning algorithms are consider a black box
a term used by cybernetician whenever a piece of machinery or else a set of
commands is too complex. In its place, the black box stands in as an opaque
substitute for technology in which nothing needs to be known other than inputs
and outputs. Once, opened, it makes both creators and the users confront the
subjective biases and processes that have resulted in a certain answer.19
This closed, black box system, presents the need for transparency, for both consumers and those
that use the algorithm. Unless a creator of an algorithm can say without a doubt that the
algorithm is only using appropriate data in determining its answers auditors should be able to
examine the code. Machine-learning algorithms present a challenge that need to be met with
accountability.
State of the Law: Examining Algorithms
I.

Barriers to Examining Algorithms
A. Trade Secret Laws
A large problem is the fact that most algorithms and the way they work are ensconced in

a black-box where the coding and technical details of how algorithms track and collect data is
mainly unknown to anyone other than the computer designers who create the algorithms.20 To
make things more complicated, the machine learning and adaptive quality of the complex
algorithms used today that constantly change to provide more tailored results evolve to a point
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where its computer engineer creators may not even recognize or have the ability to control. 21
Unfortunately, with today's technology competition of search engines and web platforms
attempting to provide the most accurate results for customers, the likelihood of divulging such
information to the public would violate companies' trade secrets self interest. The problem with
the inaccessibility of black box trade secrets with algorithms is the reliance on data conclusions
that human decisionmakers do not understand.
While most trade secret law is statutory varying from state to state, federal and
international regulations like the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) provide commonalities in
trade secret law. The general goals of trade secret laws are to protect commercially valuable
proprietary information that gives competitive advantage, including business strategies,
management, design concepts, manufacturing techniques, and formulas. According to the
Congressional Research Services (CRS) Report:
Whether information qualifies as a “trade secret” under federal or state
law is a question of fact that may be determined by a jury. A jury may
consider several factors in assessing whether certain material is a trade
secret, including the following: the extent to which the information is
known outside of the company; the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in the company; the extent of measures
taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the information; the value
of the information to the company and to its competitors; the amount of
effort or money expended by the company in developing the

21
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information; and the ease or difficulty with which the information could
be properly acquired or duplicated by others.22
Companies will continue to be protected by trade secret law, as unlike patents or copyrights,
trade secrets never expire and therefore do not ever have to be revealed or released to the
public.23
At the state level, Washington’s trade secret law is codified in RCW 19.108.010 which
defines trade secret to mean information including a formula or method that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.24
The only ways in which trade secret protection can be lost are if there is even a single
unprotected disclosure to the public of the trade secret (either by photograph, technical, paper,
or any other form of disclosure); the product is legally reverse engineered to discover the trade
secret; or if a competitor independently develops around it.25 The crux of trade secret
protections revolve around reasonable measures that a company has taken to maintain secrecy.26
Algorithms used to enhance search engine results or provide predictions on rates of
recidivism of criminally convicted individuals are certainly information that has substantial
economic value, engendering fierce competition, incentivizing its secrecy. An oft-referred to
22
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example is Google’s use of multiple algorithms that optimize search results for users, known in
the industry as RankBrain and Page Rank, which has deep machine learning components that
are not only complex but heavily guarded in secrecy.27 Google and other commercial service
providers maintain strict rules to prevent competitors from analyzing and reverse engineering
their algorithms, protected by trade secret and patent law.28 Thus, whether at a federal or state
level, the formula that computer engineers use to create such systems are difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain in order to challenge or analyze even if a lawmaker, attorney, or judge was
adept at computer engineering. Further, the incentive to maintain the innovative nature of
technology via the use of algorithms counsels against blanket legislation directed at undoing or
diminishing the role of trade secret laws.29
B. Deep Learning: Questions That Simply Cannot Be Answered by Data Scientists.
The goal for learner algorithms is to theoretically become self sufficient. Data scientists
strive to create the “Master Algorithm,” one in which the algorithm self corrects and correlates
data without feedback from the data scientists.30 As algorithms continue to process data and
create parameters based on patterns apparent in the data the outcomes may move away from the
original intention but still fall within the goal of the program. This creates several problems as
some algorithms have advanced to the point that the creators are no longer sure as to how the
algorithm comes to its final answer. If the data scientists and algorithm creators are no longer
able to identify the process which the algorithm used to determine its answer, how is anyone
able to identify the path the algorithm took? The profiles created by data brokers are put into an
algorithm and an answer is given depending on the sector: whether it’s this individual is going
Danny Sullivan, Sneak Peak into Black Box of Google’s Search Algorithm, Sᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Eɴɢɪɴᴇ Lᴀɴᴅ (June 23, 2016,
1:01 PM), http://searchengineland.com/faq-all-about-the-new-google-rankbrain-algorithm-234440.
28
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29
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to be a great employee to this individual has a high potential recidivism rate. Leaner algorithms
inhibits the transparency needed to ensure only appropriate categories of data are used (not race,
sex, ethnic background, etc.) to make determinations.
II.

Laws Which Enable the Examination of Algorithms
The unregulated nature of algorithms has begun to change as society begins to recognize

the dangers of leaving algorithms primarily in charge of human decisionmaking. A good sign
is the European Union (EU), for example, which has incorporated a new routine regarding the
use of machine learning algorithms. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
effective in May 2018, will legally provide a “right to explanation” for users to challenge the
ways in which algorithms are used especially in decisions made about them.31 Additionally,
Article 22 (“Automated individual decision-making, including profiling”) lists prohibitions
against the use of algorithms in systems like credit and insurance risk assessments and other
programs which may use machine learning techniques.32 While the effects of the new law
cannot be fully understood before 2018, the outlook is positive in understanding the need to
regulate and understand the tools that underlie so much of human decisionmaking.
Other methods have also emerged to combat the issues raised by the secretive and
complicated nature of algorithms perpetuating discrimination. Among them are methods like
(1) algorithmic auditing, in which test variables are placed into search engines or systems run
by algorithms to find discrepancies due to racial barriers; (2) using consumer protection laws
like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to provide for equal opportunity protections affected
by algorithmic tailoring in a commercial setting; (3) antitrust laws in lieu of overcoming trade
secret laws to perhaps regulate the use and creation of algorithms in ways that may engender
Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and a “Right
to Explanation”, Oxꜰ ᴏʀᴅ Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴇᴛ Iɴꜱ ᴛɪᴛᴜᴛᴇ (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.08813v3.pdf.
32
Id. at 2.
31
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open competition of search optimization corporations, for example; and (4) constitutional law
claims against government agencies from using algorithms that result in disparate effects based
on complex, unverified, and biased data assumptions.
A. Algorithmic Auditing
In order to protect consumers and individuals freely giving information online for
services there needs to be an auditing mechanism which allows independent third parties to
evaluate the algorithms in use to search for and determine whether biases are present in the
system. In order for this to be plausible, “data brokers need to fess up about the data they are
hoarding, trading and selling.”33 Similar to the laws being established in the E.U., governments
in the U.S. need to create policies to keep internet companies accountable.
B. Consumer Protection Laws
Many Federal regulations have already been implemented in the field of consumer
protection in different sectors by Federal Agencies. These laws could possibly be applied to the
realm of algorithms and collection of data in order to protect consumers from the potentially
discriminatory outcomes. Data brokers create profiles of individuals by accumulating data from
several different companies. These profiles are created unknowingly by monitoring everyday
online interactions. Acts likes the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; The FTC Act; Fair Credit
Reporting Act; and Equal Employment Opportunity Act were all created to protect consumers
and individuals from bigger (more sophisticated) parties.
i.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act34

The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) mission is to protect consumers by preventing
business practices that are unfair or deceptive.35 The FTC has taken upon itself the role of

33
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enforcer under its Section 5 powers to ensure online business is conducted fairly.36 In regards to
the use of big data and algorithms the FTC has published a report seeking the creation of fair
guidelines to ensure the privacy of individuals and best business practice.37 FTC Chair Edith
Ramirez stated we must “ensure that by using big data algorithms [firms] are not accidentally
classifying people based on categories that society has decided- by law or ethics - not to use,
such as race, ethnic background, gender, and sexual orientation.”38
The Computer Fraud and Abuse act provides punishment for individuals that have had
accessed and violated another’s privacy by obtaining information through the individual's
computer without permission or caused that individual harm by using that information with
intent to defraud.39 If the act were to be applicable corporations, the entities would most likely
be found to have violated the act by using individuals information to determine a “proxy credit
score.” The information often used to create “proxy credit” scores, is information that an
individual might have given to a website for another purpose. The information was not intended
to be used for the purposes of determining a credit score and therefore, the information was
obtained without the consent of the individual.
ii.

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)40

The purpose of the FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to “ adopt reasonable
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and
other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the

35

Federal Trade Commission, About the FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
37
FTC, Big Data, supra, note 11.
38
Pasquale, supra note 16, at 40 (citing Edith Ramirez, “Privacy Challenges in the Era of Big Data: The View from
the Lifeguard’s Chair,” Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum (Aug. 19, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-big-data-viewlifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf ).
39
18 U.S.C § 1030.
40
15 U.S.C. § 1681.
36

13

confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”41 The law
outlaws the use of certain information about individuals to used in determining credit
worthiness, which relates to an individual’s credit score (e.g. the neighborhood in which one
lives (redlining), race, color, religion, national origin, sex, etc.)42. The act should theoretically
limit the usage of data obtained online to prevent the use of information that goes into a credit
score, however, the act is specifically tailored to apply only to “credit reporting agencies.” The
FTC has called for data brokers to be included in the scope of the act,.43 “Credit Reporting
Agencies,” are defined in FCRA to means any individual for money, or fees, that “engages in
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties.”44 Applying this definition to Data Brokers, Data Brokers sell information about
individuals to third parties in order for the third parties to develop “proxy credit scores” based
on the information that has been received. Therefore, as the FTC claims, Data Brokers should
be considered “Credit Reporting Agencies” under FCRA.
C. Antitrust Laws
As data collection and the internet have become dominated by relatively few companies,
especially in the realm of search engines, there have been many claims against large internet
companies in regard to antitrust violations, specifically Section 2 of the Sherman Act.45 These
antitrust claims are not only popping up in the United States but in the European Union as
well.46 In relation to Google specifically, Joshua Hazan, has found that the company’s method

41
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of sorting search results favors its own subsidiaries or related companies over third parties.47
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”48 In order
to meet this standard a company must (1) have “dangerously” close to or has already achieved a
monopoly power and (2) participate in anticompetitive conduct.49
The Federal Trade Commission has attempted to bring action against Google under the
Sherman Act to challenge its use of search ranking algorithms to benefit its own products over
that of their competitors. The FTC claim against Google regarded the algorithms hindering
competitive behavior by manipulating its search options for consumers. However, the success
has been limited, and the FTC concluded its investigation without major changes to Google’s
search ranking practices.50 However, the European Commission has brought a more anticompetitive action against Google under the same claims of inherent algorithmic unfairness it is
search ranking results relating to comparison shopping services which were preferred in Google
search results over Google’s competitors. Google’s search engine dominates 90% of the
European market share and therefore its influence on the market in the EU may make the
European Commission’s claim stronger than the FTC’s investigation under the Sherman Act.51
i.

The Fourth Amendment

47
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The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is meant to protect the right of “people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,”52 this right has been extended to
protect that which people assume or reasonably suspect to be private in terms of information
that is posted given free online.53
Case Study
I.

Use of Algorithms in Hiring and Firing Practices
A case study in the use of algorithms to decide hiring and firing practices is instructive

because the consequences of its use is not straightforwardly positive or negative. In criminal
sentencing, predictive policing, lending and credit score ratings, and insurance coverage, the
results of using algorithms have been clearly negative on a wide scale and often a clear proxy
for race. However, the results of using algorithms in hiring and firing practices is not absolute.
There is still space for change especially when the disparate impact is usually not a result of
malicious intent in the creation of the algorithm. As long as blind reliance is avoided and
transparency in the algorithm used is ensured, algorithms may be successful in the human
resources world.
The use of algorithms in predictive policing contexts has been evidenced to result in
negative and discriminatory consequences, as well as the use of algorithms in credit scoring
coding particular individuals as high risk or lazy simply because of their name or their zip
code.54 However, it is undeniable that using algorithms to analyze numerous resumes filed by
over-optimistic candidates is a positive and efficient use of the tool. Further, directing
algorithms to look for whether candidates meet a specific education requirement, for example, is
not necessarily illegal while other hiring benchmarks like proxy intelligence tests are.
52
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However, one cannot ignore the disparate impact that the use of algorithms have on minority
groups in many areas of the work force. Furthermore, the secrecy and complexity of algorithms
in making these determinations are dangerously ensconced in a black box that no one, not even
employers carrying out the hiring and firing decisions based on these algorithms, can explain
the reasons behind the choice. Therefore, while there are many arguments for the positive effect
and use of algorithms in hiring practices, it is still important to be cognizant of ways that these
tools can mask discrimination.
A. Defining the Problem
An example of algorithms used in the field of human resources is told by Cathy O’Neil
in her book, Weapons of Math Destruction.55 Ms. O’Neil identifies Sarah Wysocki, a fifth grade
teacher who had routinely received positive scores on her yearly performance reviews, yet was
abruptly given abysmal scores the year an algorithm was used to evaluate teachers rather than
human based performance reviews. Ms. Wysocki was later terminated because of district-wide
policy to cut low performing teachers. Ms. O’Neil and Ms. Wysocki both argue that algorithms
ignore the wide range of soft factors that go into human resources and evaluations of
performance like teaching, which is not inherently data-driven.56 Student to teacher
relationship, self-esteem, and parent comfort levels with the teacher are all factors incapable of
being evaluated by algorithms.
Another problem with algorithms that Ms. Wysocki’s story reveals is the dangerous lack
of transparency inherent in how algorithms arrive at their conclusion about job performance.
Even if advocates of algorithms argue that these tools remove human error and bias which
might have given Wysocki soft and positive evaluations in the past, there is no denying that

55
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school administrators relying on these algorithms do not understand how the algorithm found
Wysocki inadequate. When Ms. Wysocki sought explanations as to why she received such a
low score, how she could improve, and what she could work on, her school principal and the
district simply did not know.57 They had blindly trusted a private company program that had
promised efficient and accurate identification of problem teachers, without “peeking under the
hood” of the algorithm to know what it was that the tool was actually evaluating. Even if they
had been given full access to the code and data used by computer engineers, the likelihood that
a school administrator could understand its significance is low.
This lack of transparency is frustrating for someone in Ms. Wysocki’s position, as well
as many other teachers who are faced with technology-based evaluations and performance
reviews based on standardized test results of their students. However, it is even more insidious
and dangerous when discriminatory impact results for the use of these algorithms, with no one
to explain why or how this discrimination is occurring. When companies and government
agencies begin to use algorithms for hiring and firing purposes, and see decreased minority
representation in their workforce, for example, without transparency behind what is really going
on in the algorithm, such blind reliance on these technology tools can have harmful social
effects.
When talking about the use of algorithms to replace humans in the recruitment and
retention of employees decisionmaking process, there are diametrically opposing viewpoints some believe that this is the only neutral way in ensuring diversity and equality in the working
field,58 while others think that algorithms serve as a mask for inherent discrimination59. The
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truth is somewhere in between: while humans are notorious for implicit bias, a total reliance on
algorithms can continue the trends that humans have already perpetuated. For example, in the
context of employment, the hiring of employees can be greatly streamlined if an employer
receives thousands of resumes a day for any given position, an algorithm that codes for specific
requirements can eliminate non-starter candidates and save the employer time and money from
sifting through piles of applications by hand. However, if algorithms are written to look for
terms in the resume which end up being a proxy for race or gender. Especially when great
weight is given to the reputation of a university, the systemic inequities that may have prevented
an otherwise well-qualified applicant from enrolling in a prestigious institute of higher learning
would then be perpetuated in the work field, further causing wealth and social disparities.
Further, algorithms that look for certain terms or specific education requirements may ignore
“soft” factors which could perpetuate systemic discrepancies in education and social economics,
leading to an even widened minority gap.
Even more involved than sifting through large piles of resumes for keywords, some
algorithms mine for data about a particular candidate to find attributes about a person that
would suggest a good employee (punctuality, charisma, detail-oriented translating to being a
good salesperson, longer tenure, or high production value).60 Data-mining is a complicated
practice, but in the employment context, it includes algorithms combing through the internet’s
vast networking and informational system about a candidate and aggregate information to form
conclusions given trends or patterns in every piece of information about them available - from
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zip code to social media behavior.61 This way, data-mining algorithms get a more holistic
image of what a candidate is truly like and therefore arrive at more “accurate” predictions about
their likelihood of success at a given position. However, because data on racial and gender
minorities already reflect a trend in inequalities that result in lower employment rates, higher
conviction rates, more time off from work to care for family, etc., the algorithms blinding
churning through this data will only learn from this system of inequalities and make predictions
about minority candidates based on patterns in the minority group. 62 Therefore, minority
candidates will still be labeled by algorithms as less favorable for employment because of
existing societal bias. Algorithms do not solve the problem of bias, but further hides the
problem under a veil of neutrality.
Finally, another issue presented with algorithmic hiring that emphasizes data mining and
pattern recognition is the populations on the fringes of technology who are left out of the
employment process if they do not have access to technology. For example, if geographically
or economically, a certain group of individuals are less likely to engage in technology like
social media or reference the correct coded terms in their job applications and resumes for
algorithms to identify, their lack of technological footprint may preclude them from otherwise
viable employment opportunities.63 This discrimination by ommission further marginalizes
those who are economically vulnerable through barriers in technology.
Some look to the technology industry as an indicator of where overreliance on
algorithms in hiring practices have gone wrong, where as little as two percent of Google’s vast
work force, for example, was African American.64As Frank Pasquale states, “algorithms just dry
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up discrimination further up.”65 The problem with algorithms in aiding the human
decisionmaking process in employment practices is has more to do with the assumption that
algorithms are unbiased and neutral without understanding the mechanisms that go into
developing the algorithm or how the algorithm arrives at a particular result. The “black box” of
algorithms - whether it be an complexity of computer coding or the trade secret protections of
data brokers or companies who develop algorithms making the understanding of algorithms
opaque - hampers a reasonable approach to human resources to justify hiring and firing
decisions.66
Even more dangerously, this black box of secrecy can allow discrimination based on
race or gender to proliferate insidiously and go undetected until disparate impacts on minority
populations are revealed. Perhaps the European Union’s solution in the Right to Know and
challenge algorithmic decisions can pave a way to better accountability and oversight which
could reveal the dangers of relying on secret formulas that no one can explain.
B. Where Does the Bias Enter the Algorithm?
Bias enters the algorithm mostly at the early stages of creation. Discrimination can
result in primarily two ways: First, algorithms are learning tools, which mimic human behavior.
For example, if a particular company has hired more men than women or has retained mostly
white employees, an algorithm may associate the majority gender or race as qualities of
successful employees, and therefore select applicants who are male, or white, or have whitesounding names.67 In this way, because of institutionalized discrimination already prevalent by
human machinations, algorithms mimic these patterns to perpetuate prior prejudices. The
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following is an example of what Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst describe as the “garbage
in, garbage out” problem of data science:
If LinkedIn determines which candidates to recommend based on the demonstrated
interest of employers in certain types of candidates, Talent Match will offer
recommendations that reflect whatever biases employers happen to exhibit. In particular,
if LinkedIn’s algorithm observes that employers disfavor certain candidates who are
members of a protected class, Talent Match may decrease the rate at which it
recommends these candidates to employers. The recommendation engine would learn to
cater to the prejudicial preferences of employers.68
The second way that algorithms intuit bias is through the creation of the code itself. If
the code looks for certain terms that are characteristic to one particular protected class of
minorities, then the resulting candidate pool shrinks to those who have those desired traits.
Similar to proxy credit scoring, if coded terms are simply a proxy for race, for example, like zip
codes, the effect would be a homogenous set of individuals. Further, if there are flaws in the
underlying data being collected which rely on historical prejudices or systemic inequalities,
such trends will be baked into the underlying algorithm and further exacerbate the
discrimination, however unintentional.
Both of these problems extend in some way from faulty data. For example, if a
company or agency uses an algorithm based on grades or assessments given by human
generated performance evaluations, whatever bias from previous human input would be
perpetuated and expanded by the algorithm with no corrective oversight.69 Solon Barocas and
Andrew D. Selbst have deemed both of these algorithmic errors as false or inaccurate target
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classifications.70 Algorithms work by classifying and labelling traits and qualities in order to
come to a conclusion about an individual with predictive ability. Either through mining data
about a job applicant or decoding language on an applicant’s resume and application, by
identifying patterns regarding a person with a subset of certain traits and the patterns associated
with each of those traits, algorithms can then generate an easy conclusion on which employers
base their hiring and firing decisions. Yet because these errors are common, innocent, opaque,
and its impact pervasive over reliance on stereotypical pattern-matching can lead to vastly
disparate impact for minority populations. For example, if turnover rates for minority groups
have a pattern of being high, an employer who engages in algorithmic hiring that codes for
likelihood of tenure status would be less likely to find minority applicants identified as qualified
candidates.71
C. What Laws Might Be Applicable?
While protected minority classes like race, gender, sexual orientation, and veteran status
are covered from employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the legal
hurdle with combatting discrimination with the use of algorithms in hiring and firing practices is
the lack of clear evidence of knowledge or intent to discriminate. The only avenue that lawyers
can seek is through disparate impact litigation - by looking at the negative results that
algorithmic hiring produces even without malicious intent. A successful attempt at this strategy
was Griggs v. Duke Power Company,72 where the Supreme Court ruled that it was a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for the power company to use intelligence test scores and the
receipt of a high school diploma as the sole basis of hiring decisions where the impact is its
exclusion of racial minorities. However, the reach of this case’s success is limited in that
70
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disparate impact litigation is only applicable if the plaintiffs can prove that the hiring
requirements used are irrelevant to the task required of by the job. If, however, a company or
government agency can argue that such requirements are a “business necessity” and directly
related to job performance, then, regardless of the discriminatory impact or disparate results, the
hiring practice will be deemed valid as long as no malicious discriminatory intent was
involved.73 This business necessity argument holds even further weight if the predictive power
of algorithms are accurate in assuring high quality candidates, even though it turns a blind eye
to other candidates from minority groups.74
Furthermore, after the Gideon v. Duke Power Company decision, employers have begun
to substitute illegal intelligence tests with proxy personality tests which sometimes mirror the
aspects of intelligence tests that would unfairly stigmatize applicants. For example, a class
action lawsuit was filed against many large corporations for their use of personality tests in job
applications that inherently test for medical and mental disabilities with questions like “Do you
find yourself angry often?”75 Algorithms are then used to detect a pattern or likelihood of
individuals with these traits and their tendencies for mental or emotional instability, and
therefore discourage employers from choosing these candidates. Such tests, if truly equated to
medical questions, would run afoul of the sanctions in place through the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) which prohibits employers from discriminating against hiring an
otherwise qualified applicant due to a disability.76 Yet employers and private creators of such
personality tests have found ways to circumvent these regulations by asking more nuanced
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questions that do not reflect medical information on its face, and therefore disqualify disabled
applicants from employment.77
The secrecy and complexity behind algorithmic decisions is therefore dangerous not
only because there is little to no way of telling whether malicious discriminatory intent was
purposely coded into the algorithm, but also because most likely algorithms will intuit patterns
on their own and inadvertently produce the disparate impact on minority groups. A blind
reliance on algorithms does little to challenge the status quo and the preexisting societal biases
they perpetuate.
D.

Possible Solutions in This Field

Of course transparency and regulation of algorithmic use in the public and private
sectors would be ideal. However, this approach is riddled with faults as discussed in the above
sections regarding barriers to regulation and the current state of the law. If the European Union
is successful with their reform-minded Right to Explanation in the new iteration of the GDPR in
2018, then perhaps there is the possibility of algorithms being made with clarity and employers
are fully informed of how the algorithms work (computer science data and all) so as to
understand the results. It would be a great step forward, yet there are still barriers to such
transparency implemented in the United States even if the GDPR was successful. Again, the
state of the law mentioned in above sections like trade secret laws still prevent the much needed
regulatory framework around algorithms.
Some have suggested that the disparate impact faced by minorities in the workplace,
since it is systemic and cannot be dealt with through individual lawsuits, should instead be

77

O’Neil, supra note 15, at 109.

25

treated much like affirmative action or disability law.78 In this way, the burden is on the
employer to look at hiring schemes including the use of algorithms through the lens of equality
and impact rather than through efficiency or pure profit driven goals. This way, there would not
be a prohibition on the use of algorithms or data mining to inform employers, but a more open
approach in understanding the effect that employing such algorithms might have and finding
ways to counteract the systemic biases it perpetuates.
And similar to the ADA, changes to the workplace to accommodate candidates with
traits that algorithms have deemed to be a predictor of a bad employee could change the
predicted outcome of the applicant. For example, if algorithms have detected that women with
families have lower retention rates and would therefore be undesirable for the employer who
wants to minimize tenure, the employer could change the workplace by providing flexible
schedules for those with families or make other accommodations to make the workplace more
family-friendly.79 Another example would be to make the workplace more friendly and
accepting of other cultures and welcome underrepresented minority groups. Changes to what
employers can control in their workplace can also disrupt the trajectory of discrimination
against protected classes reflected in society, and break the prophetic models of algorithms.
By recognizing the shortcomings of algorithms and avoiding blind reliance on their
seeming infallibility, employer can not only find a whole new subset of employees previously
weeded out by algorithms, but also work to change the lack of representation of minorities,
women, the disabled community, and other vulnerable classes in the work field. Further, by
recognizing these disparities, these algorithms could be retooled to account for the
discrimination and bias in society, and data-mining software can look for other societal factors
78

Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 652 (2001) (comparing
accommodations law to disparate impact).
79
Barocas, supra note 60, at 731.

26

that would account for lower employment rates, lower graduation rates, and higher incarceration
rates for an applicant.
While we cannot hope for absolute transparency of how these algorithms work, simply
being cognizant of algorithms’ potential to exclude, discriminate, and skew data can perhaps
persuade social-minded employers to add corrective measures into their hiring and firing
practices.
Conclusion
Has the use of algorithms gone too far? “A single human showing explicit bias can only
ever affect a finite number of people. An algorithm, on the other hand, has the potential to
impact the lives of exponentially more.”80 The popularity of algorithms is driven by the need for
efficiency and to provide an “unbiased” solutions. The issue is not whether it is better to use
algorithms instead of humans - clearly there is a lower chance of blatantly bias decisions being
made by the algorithm. Rather the issue is the dangers of assuming infallibility of algorithms the belief that the algorithm can do no wrong. The over reliance on the “unbiased” efficient
algorithm is the true problem.
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